Hürriyet Daily News reported that Türkiye and Italy are moving to deepen trade and investment ties after Trade Minister Ömer Bolat met Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani in Rome on September 18, a signal that two of the Mediterranean’s largest manufacturing economies see supply-chain integration as a strategic answer to geopolitical disruption, EU industrial policy shifts, and the search for higher value foreign direct investment.
Rome Talks Move From Trade Volumes To Industrial Positioning
The immediate message from Rome was practical rather than ceremonial. According to Hürriyet Daily News, Tajani said Italy wants a larger corporate presence in Türkiye and more joint projects in third countries and across the Mediterranean. Bolat said talks focused on integrated supply chains, especially automotive, and on cooperation in green energy, digitalization, space, advanced manufacturing and health care.
Italy’s Foreign Ministry gave the talks a similar framing. In its September 2026 statement, the ministry said the meeting covered infrastructure, transport links, business opportunities, strategic sectors, market access and Türkiye-EU economic relations. It also said Türkiye is one of the priority countries in Italy’s export action plan, with bilateral trade reaching 26.1 billion euros in 2025, made up of 13.7 billion euros in Italian exports and 12.4 billion euros in imports from Türkiye.
The numbers vary depending on exchange rates and statistical basis. At the April 2025 intergovernmental summit in Rome, the Türkiye Investment Office said Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni set a new 40 billion dollar bilateral trade target after the previous 30 billion dollar target was reached. The Associated Press also reported at the time that the two governments had achieved the 30 billion dollar threshold and were moving the target to 40 billion dollars.
That matters for investors because the relationship is no longer just a buyer-seller corridor. It is increasingly a platform for co-production, EU-market access, defense cooperation and third-market contracting. Hürriyet Daily News cited Bolat as saying Italian direct investment in Türkiye had reached 4 billion dollars across 1,645 companies, while Turkish investment in Italy exceeded 1 billion dollars. The Investment Office has separately said more than 1,500 Italian companies have invested about 5 billion dollars in Türkiye over the past 22 years, suggesting a mature base rather than a speculative opening.
Why Italy Sees Türkiye As A Supply-Chain Partner
The strongest commercial logic is manufacturing. Türkiye sits inside the EU Customs Union for industrial goods, while retaining cost, labor, supplier and location advantages that many European manufacturers see as useful for nearshoring. The European Commission says EU-Türkiye goods trade reached a record 217.6 billion euros in 2025, with Türkiye remaining the EU’s fifth-largest goods trade partner and the EU taking 42.7% of Türkiye’s goods exports.
Automotive is the clearest example. Türkiye’s Uludağ Automotive Industry Exporters’ Association reported that automotive exports rose 11.6% in 2025 to 41.5 billion dollars, making the sector Türkiye’s export champion. OIB said the supply industry alone reached 15.77 billion dollars, while the EU accounted for 72.5% of Turkish automotive exports. That is why Bolat’s emphasis on automotive supply chains in Rome is more than sectoral diplomacy. It points to a production network in which Italian machinery, components, engineering, vehicle platforms and design capabilities can be matched with Turkish assembly, supplier depth and regional export reach.
The same logic applies to defense and aerospace. The Associated Press reported in April 2025 that Türkiye’s Baykar had reached a memorandum of understanding with Italy’s Leonardo for unmanned aerial vehicle production, following Baykar’s acquisition of Piaggio Aerospace. The Türkiye Investment Office said the two governments signed 11 memoranda of understanding at the summit, covering trade, industrial investment, defense, science and technology, space, transport and other areas.
For foreign investors, this kind of cooperation raises the sophistication of the Turkish market. Market entry is no longer only about selling into an 85 million person domestic economy. It may involve choosing a Turkish location for EU-linked production, forming a joint venture, applying for investment incentives, meeting Turkish and EU technical standards, and using Türkiye as a project-management base for the Balkans, North Africa, the Caucasus, Central Asia or the Gulf.
Maritime Shocks Strengthen The Nearshoring Case
The Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz featured directly in the Rome talks. Anadolu Agency reported that Tajani and Bolat discussed the impact of those crises on international trade, while Tajani said Italy wanted joint initiatives in third markets and across the Mediterranean.
The timing is important. The OECD said in its April 2026 FDI in Figures report that global FDI flows rose to 1.66 trillion dollars in 2025, but greenfield investment announcements stalled, especially in emerging and developing economies. In other words, capital is available, but investors are more selective. Supply-chain resilience, route diversity and political risk mitigation are becoming core investment criteria.
Türkiye benefits from that shift when it can present itself as a production and logistics alternative to longer Asian supply chains. It also faces risk from the same volatility. Daily Sabah reported in August 2026 that Türkiye’s central bank raised its end-2026 inflation forecast to 28%, with Governor Fatih Karahan citing energy, diesel, natural gas and commodity price pressures. For manufacturers, logistics disruption is not just a shipping issue. It affects input prices, working capital, inventory strategy, contract pricing and foreign exchange exposure.
This is where investment planning becomes operational. A foreign company considering an Italian-Turkish manufacturing or distribution structure must assess customs classifications, import-export documentation, local sourcing rules, free zone or organized industrial zone options, VAT and withholding tax treatment, and the practical reliability of ports, rail links and road corridors. Advisory support around import-export facilitation, legal and tax compliance, and project management becomes central to whether a strategic idea can function on the ground.
The EU Dimension Is Both Advantage And Constraint
Türkiye’s Customs Union with the EU is one of the country’s main FDI advantages, but it is not frictionless. The European Commission notes that the Customs Union, in force since 1995, removes tariffs and quantitative restrictions on industrial goods, while requiring Türkiye to align with EU commercial policy, competition rules, intellectual property rights and technical legislation in covered areas. The Commission also notes that a 2016 proposal to modernize the Customs Union, including services, public procurement and sustainable development, has still not received negotiating directives from the Council.
That creates a mixed picture for investors. On one hand, Türkiye offers industrial access to Europe that many emerging markets cannot match. On the other hand, investors must monitor EU regulatory shifts that may indirectly affect Turkish production. The Financial Times reported in September 2026 that Türkiye, the United Kingdom and Japan were seeking fuller inclusion in proposed EU “Made in Europe” car-sector rules, a sign that Turkish manufacturers worry about being excluded from future European subsidy and procurement frameworks despite Customs Union integration.
The European Parliament Research Service’s 2026 briefing on the 2025 Commission report also underlined the political constraints. It said the EU is re-engaging with Türkiye in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner, while accession talks remain stalled and rule-of-law concerns continue to shape the broader relationship.
For corporate decision-makers, this means government relations and regulatory liaison are not optional. Projects involving automotive, batteries, defense, aerospace, health care, data, energy or public infrastructure may require careful engagement with Turkish ministries, investment agencies, sector regulators, municipalities and EU-facing compliance advisers. A market-entry plan that ignores Brussels-linked regulation can quickly become outdated.
Investment Climate: Improving Signals, Persistent Due Diligence
Türkiye’s broader investment climate is sending more constructive signals than it did several years ago, but investors still need rigorous due diligence. The Türkiye Investment Office says the country attracted about 288 billion dollars of FDI during 2003-2025, compared with 15 billion dollars before 2002, and that companies with international capital reached 86,926 by mid-2025. It also says EY ranked Türkiye as Europe’s fourth most popular greenfield FDI destination in 2024 by number of projects.
Türkiye’s 2024-2028 FDI strategy aims to raise the country’s share of global FDI inflows to 1.5% and to capture 12% of inflows into the Central and Eastern Europe, Middle East and North Africa region by 2028. Moody’s upgraded Türkiye to Ba3 with a stable outlook in 2026, according to TRT World, citing a stronger policymaking track record, reduced risk of policy reversal and improving confidence in the Turkish lira.
Yet macroeconomic stabilization remains incomplete. Inflation is still high by peer standards, financing costs are elevated, and energy-price shocks can affect imported inputs and transport. For Italian and other European investors, the opportunity is not simply to “buy Türkiye risk,” but to structure it. That can mean lira and euro cost matching, phased capital expenditure, incentive-backed site selection, local supplier audits, arbitration clauses, tax planning, and clear governance for joint ventures.
Company incorporation and corporate structuring are particularly important in sectors where foreign investors may need Turkish partners, local licenses, public procurement eligibility, or sector-specific approvals. Incentives also require disciplined preparation. Türkiye’s system can support strategic, regional, priority, large-scale and project-based investments, but eligibility depends on sector, location, technology level, employment, import substitution and export potential.
What This Means For Foreign Investors
The renewed Türkiye-Italy push is best understood as part of a wider Mediterranean investment realignment. Italy wants export growth, resilient supply chains and third-market reach. Türkiye wants higher value FDI, stronger EU-linked manufacturing, and a larger role in green, digital, defense and advanced industrial value chains. The overlap is real, but it is execution-heavy.
For foreign investors, the first step is market entry analysis that separates headline political support from bankable demand, supplier availability, location economics and regulatory exposure. The second is incorporation and corporate structuring, especially where joint ventures, distribution entities, manufacturing subsidiaries or regional headquarters are being considered. The third is incentives assessment, since Turkish support mechanisms can materially change project economics if the investment is located and documented correctly.
Legal and tax compliance will matter in every stage, from customs and VAT treatment to employment, data protection, environmental permits and sector licenses. Government relations and regulatory liaison will be necessary for projects in infrastructure, energy, defense, health care and advanced manufacturing. Expo and trade-fair representation can help investors test partners and customers before committing capital, while import-export facilitation and project management determine whether cross-border plans survive contact with customs, logistics and local execution.
The Rome talks do not guarantee a wave of new FDI by themselves. They do show that Türkiye and Italy are trying to turn a mature commercial relationship into a more strategic production corridor. Investors that treat the opportunity as a structured operating decision, not just a diplomatic headline, will be better placed to convert that corridor into durable market presence.