French infrastructure investor Meridiam’s reported preparations to bid with Turkish contractor Makyol for the operating rights of Istanbul’s two Bosphorus bridges signal a possible return of big-ticket foreign capital to Türkiye’s privatization market, but the transaction will test whether Ankara can balance fiscal pressure, public sensitivity over tolls and investor demand for bankable long-term infrastructure concessions.
A Landmark Asset Sale Moves Back Into View
The immediate trigger is a Bloomberg-sourced report carried by Ege Alternatif and Türkiye Today that Meridiam is preparing to join Makyol İnşaat in a consortium for the expected tender covering Istanbul’s 15 July Martyrs Bridge and Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge, alongside state-owned toll highways. Türkiye Today reported on July 29, 2026 that several Turkish construction groups are also seeking foreign partners ahead of the bidding process, indicating that the government is trying to create a competitive field rather than a single negotiated transaction.
The assets are among the most politically visible pieces of transport infrastructure in Türkiye. The 15 July Martyrs Bridge, opened in 1973, was Istanbul’s first road crossing over the Bosphorus. The Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge, opened in 1988, is the city’s second Bosphorus bridge and part of the wider Trans-European Motorway network. According to Türkiye Today, citing Türkiye’s General Directorate of Highways, the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge carried an average of 239,217 vehicles a day in 2025, while the 15 July Martyrs Bridge handled about 185,301 daily crossings.
The reported structure matters. Reuters reported in April 2026, through Türkiye Today’s summary, that officials were considering concession rights rather than outright asset sales. Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloğlu also said the government was not planning a full sale, but tenders for operating rights over a defined period. That distinction will be central for foreign investors: ownership remains public, while private capital seeks returns through toll collection, maintenance obligations and contractual rights.
Why Meridiam Is a Credible Bidder
Meridiam is not a new name in Türkiye. The Paris-based infrastructure investor has already built a track record in Turkish public-private partnerships, particularly in healthcare. Meridiam said in its own project announcements that it invested with Rönesans, Samsung C&T and Istanbul Asset Management in the €803 million Gaziantep City Hospital, a PPP under the Ministry of Health’s national healthcare program. Earlier, Meridiam said its Turkish healthcare portfolio included more than 4,400 beds and over €1.5 billion of investment with Rönesans, including Bursa City Hospital.
That history is relevant because Türkiye’s infrastructure market rewards investors that understand local concession structures, public counterparties, lenders, land issues and operating interfaces. A bridge and highway package would be different from a hospital PPP, but the common themes are long concession tenors, Turkish public agencies, foreign debt, inflation exposure and political scrutiny.
Makyol would bring domestic construction and concession experience. Türkiye Today noted that Makyol is a shareholder, through Otoyol AŞ, in the operator of the Gebze-Orhangazi-İzmir Motorway and Osmangazi Bridge, one of Türkiye’s flagship build-operate-transfer corridors. For Meridiam, partnering with a local infrastructure group could reduce execution risk, improve government relations and strengthen operational credibility in a tender where technical and political confidence will matter as much as headline price.
Investor interest is not limited to Meridiam. Reuters reported in April 2026 that a Turkish delegation and EY met Portugal’s Brisa, the country’s largest highway operator, to discuss the planned process. That approach suggests Ankara is targeting international toll-road specialists and institutional infrastructure capital, not only domestic contractors.
The Fiscal Logic Behind The Privatization Push
The timing is not accidental. Türkiye’s 2026 to 2028 Medium-Term Program, prepared by the Presidency of Strategy and Budget and the Ministry of Treasury and Finance, projects general government privatization revenues of TL 185 billion in 2026, up sharply from TL 21 billion estimated for 2025. The same program projects the central government budget deficit at 3.5 percent of GDP in 2026, then 3.1 percent in 2027 and 2.8 percent in 2028.
For Treasury and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek’s economic program, privatization can serve several purposes. It can raise non-tax revenue, reduce the state’s operating burden, signal investor confidence and support fiscal consolidation while monetary policy remains tight. The Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye kept its one-week repo rate at 37 percent in July 2026, according to Trading Economics and central bank reporting, while TurkStat data published through the central bank showed annual consumer inflation at 32.11 percent in June 2026.
These conditions make infrastructure concessions attractive but complicated. Toll roads offer hard-asset exposure, demand resilience and potential inflation-linked revenue. At the same time, high lira interest rates, exchange-rate risk and political limits on toll increases can compress returns unless the contract allocates risk clearly.
The government has been here before. In 2012, a consortium including Koç Holding, Malaysia’s UEM Group and Gözde Girişim won a tender for the two Bosphorus bridges and roughly 2,000 kilometers of highways with a $5.7 billion bid. The transaction was later shelved after then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said offers below $7 billion were unacceptable. That precedent will shape investor expectations in 2026: bidders will study not only the assets, but also the political threshold for a deal that Ankara can defend publicly.
Traffic Volume Is Strong, But Pricing Is Sensitive
The investment case begins with traffic. Türkiye Today reported that state-operated routes recorded 585.9 million vehicle crossings in 2025 and generated nearly TL 1.9 billion in toll revenue, citing official data. Across state-operated and PPP-built routes, the same report said Türkiye recorded 1.1 billion vehicle crossings on highways and bridges in 2025.
Yet high volume does not automatically translate into high concession value. The Bosphorus bridges are politically sensitive urban assets used by commuters, logistics operators and service businesses. A private operator would need a toll formula that supports maintenance, financing and return on capital, but any aggressive repricing could trigger public backlash.
The comparison with other privately operated bridges is central to the debate. KGM toll schedules and Türkiye Today reporting show that tolls on newer PPP assets such as the Osmangazi Bridge and 1915 Çanakkale Bridge are far higher than on the two older Bosphorus bridges. Türkiye Today reported that, as of July 1, 2026, the 15 July Martyrs Bridge and Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge were not included in the latest toll adjustment affecting Osmangazi and 1915 Çanakkale, leaving their passenger-car tolls at TL 59. KGM’s published July 2026 tariff for the 1915 Çanakkale Bridge lists a TL 1,170 passenger-car toll.
Opposition politicians have seized on that gap. Turkish Minute reported in February 2026 that CHP deputy chair Deniz Yavuzyılmaz argued a 25-year transfer of bridge and highway operating rights could cost the public at least $48 billion, based on his assumptions about toll increases and financing. Bianet also reported that Yavuzyılmaz cited KGM performance data to argue that the two bridges alone generated about $112 million in annual net income in 2024 and that their traffic was already near peak levels.
Those claims are political and depend on assumptions about future tolls, traffic and discount rates. Still, they underline a real investor issue: revenue cannot be modeled purely as an engineering or traffic question. It is a regulated public-service question, requiring legal and tax compliance, stakeholder mapping and government relations throughout the concession life.
The FDI Mechanics Investors Will Need To Navigate
For foreign bidders, the practical work will be demanding. A consortium would likely need a Turkish special purpose vehicle, shareholder agreements, financing documents, security packages, tax structuring and regulatory approvals before financial close. That makes incorporation and corporate structuring a core workstream, especially where a foreign infrastructure fund partners with a Turkish contractor and possibly international lenders.
Market entry analysis will also be more complex than in a standard acquisition. Investors need granular traffic forecasting by route, vehicle class, season, fuel prices, competing crossings, public transport policy and logistics demand. The Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge is more exposed to freight and intercity flows than the 15 July Martyrs Bridge, which is more urban and commuter driven. Revenue assumptions must therefore reflect different demand profiles inside the same package.
Legal and tax compliance will be decisive. Investors will need to examine the concession agreement, toll adjustment mechanism, VAT treatment, withholding taxes, corporate income tax exposure, dispute resolution, termination compensation and any Treasury debt-assumption provisions. Norton Rose Fulbright notes in its Türkiye infrastructure guidance that debt assumption for qualifying PPP projects can cover outstanding foreign debt and other financing obligations under defined conditions. Whether similar protections apply in this transaction will affect pricing and lender appetite.
Government relations will not be a peripheral function. The asset owner, the Privatization Administration, the General Directorate of Highways, the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, the Treasury and Finance Ministry, municipalities and regulators may all influence the tender and operating environment. A bidder that underestimates coordination risk may win the auction but struggle in implementation.
Project management also matters after the bid. These bridges are operating assets, not greenfield projects. The winner would need a transition plan for toll systems, maintenance, staffing, HGS integration, data transfer, service continuity and emergency protocols. For foreign investors, import-export facilitation could become relevant if tolling equipment, sensors, bridge-monitoring technology or specialized maintenance systems are sourced from abroad.
What This Means for Foreign Investors
Meridiam’s reported interest should be read as a signal that Türkiye remains investable for sophisticated infrastructure capital, provided the transaction is structured with credible risk allocation and political durability. The opportunity is large, traffic is proven and the state has a fiscal incentive to proceed. The risks are equally clear: toll affordability, inflation, currency mismatch, public opposition, concession enforceability and the legacy of the failed 2012 process.
Foreign investors considering this or similar Turkish infrastructure opportunities will need a disciplined advisory sequence: market entry analysis before bidding, Turkish incorporation and consortium structuring, incentive and financing review where applicable, legal and tax compliance due diligence, government relations mapping, and project management for transition and operations. For companies entering Türkiye through infrastructure, transport, logistics or public-service concessions, the lesson is that local execution capacity is not optional. It is part of the investment case itself.